• Hong Kong protests bode ill for Beijing By Francesco Sisci

Hong Kong protests bode ill for Beijing
By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING -- In the past few days, the situation in Hong Kong has created a new and unpredictable challenge to the overall stability of China.
The two relatively fast and easy ways out of the siege Hong Kong students have laid on the local government both bode ill for Beijing. 

 

If Beijing were to crack down violently on the students, this could prove to the world that the 1989 repression in Tiananmen was not an isolated episode, almost an accident, as the official version practically goes, but a pattern of behavior unfit for a global superpower, and thus proof China must be sanctioned and stopped. Yet, Beijing may have a hard time now agreeing to some of the demands from the demonstrations. 

It has already made concessions to previous democratic demonstrations; namely, it scrapped its former plans for indirect elections of the head of the territory, and promised that after 2017 there would be more political reforms.
If now, after just a few weeks, Beijing were to make further concessions, it could start a never-ending game in which students in the streets of Hong Kong actually dictate the policy agenda to Beijing on matters such as political reforms that are extremely delicate for the future of the whole country. 

Either outcome could then spark a violent internal power struggle at a time when many in the ruling Communist Party are extremely unhappy because of the tough ongoing anti-corruption campaign. 

In the devious and contorted politics of China, it can't be ruled out that those opposed to current party policies are helping and abetting the protests in Hong Kong. In fact, the problems in Hong Kong are bound to refocus the attention of party chief Xi Jinping at the next party plenum.
There, Xi originally wanted to focus on the rule of law, aimed at eliminating corruption in the party and reform of the often overbearing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Now the plenum is bound to also to address the rule of law in Hong Kong and the future of the territory, thus giving breathing room to corrupt officials and SOEs. 

The Communist Party has a long history of using popular demonstrations to advance fights within the leadership.
Only a few weeks ago, the situation in the territory seemed to have been brought under control (see Xi calls the election tune, Asia Times Online, September 5, 2014), and Xi appeared to have scored a major success in handling the political crisis in the territory. 

How things got completely turned around in just a few days is not clear. Definitely, the protesters reorganized and reconsidered their strategy and tactics. Students are much better protesters than middle-aged, middle-class people.
But most importantly, in a matter of days, local Hong Kong authorities squandered the advantage they had achieved with the Beijing concessions. 

Rather than reaching out to the common people and increasing the divide between the more moderate and more radical protesters, apparently their actions caused the democratic camp to close ranks and reorganize. Moreover, the local authorities certainly did not serve Beijing well when they vetted the White Paper on Hong Kong that at the beginning of the summer kindled this wave of demonstrations. 

So now what is there for Beijing to do? This is certainly the main question nagging the country's leaders in these hours.
In any case, there are still a few elements to consider. The students are and have to be considered "good". All young people with "hearts" elsewhere in the world would like to be in Hong Kong's streets in these hours or are sympathetic to the demonstrations. 

Those who would stay home, or be hostile to them, are young men and women without hearts and thus possibly not good material to groom as future leaders. Therefore, the young people of Hong Kong are good, and so are their aspirations for democracy. After all, even the party now claims to aspire to democracy. 

Moreover, it is clear -- to various degrees -- what the protesters want; it is not clear what Beijing wants for the political future of Hong Kong, and the White Paper is objectively outdated now. Lastly, it is clear that if Beijing, as is likely, chooses neither to crackdown or cave in, Hong Kong will still face a long-term crisis. 

Even if demonstrations are allowed to continue and then subside, they might restart at any moment before or even after the city's controversial 2017 elections.
This may drain enormous amounts of energy from Beijing at a crucial time in Xi's rule and also create snares and traps to ambush Xi and his plans for reforms. In turn, this may increase the temptation for a quick solution in Hong Kong. 

Resisting the temptation will not be easy. These may be very difficult times.